BLM Not Responsible for Homicide Spike
Summaries Written by FARAgent (AI) on February 10, 2026 · Pending Verification
In 2020 and after, many journalists, academics, and officials argued that the murder spike was not a Black Lives Matter story at all. The standard explanation was that homicide had already been rising before George Floyd was killed on May 25, and that the real drivers were the pandemic, school closures, economic stress, court shutdowns, and general social dislocation. That was not an absurd view at the time. Annual crime data were crude, the country was in chaos, and many reasonable people were wary of blaming protests against police abuse for a rise in violence that seemed to be hitting many cities at once.
The trouble came when that broad intuition was presented with more precision than the evidence could bear. A notable example was The New York Times's 2025 graphic suggesting 2020 homicides were already climbing before Floyd's death, using annual totals in a way that made the timing look earlier and cleaner than it was. Critics pointed out that the chart's placement of May 25, and its use of year-level data, blurred the obvious question of when the surge actually accelerated. More detailed city-level timelines had long shown many of the sharpest jumps arriving in the weeks after Floyd's killing, amid riots, anti-police agitation, and what many called a police pullback or "de-policing."
The debate now is not fully settled, but growing evidence suggests the old claim was too confident. A substantial body of analysts now argues that pandemic stress and institutional disruption mattered, but that they do not by themselves explain the timing, scale, and concentration of the 2020 homicide surge. Increasingly, the dispute is less about whether post-Floyd disorder played some role, and more about how large that role was. The earlier line, that the spike "started before George Floyd's death" and therefore could not meaningfully be tied to the aftermath, is increasingly recognized as a shaky way to describe a very consequential sequence of events.
- Steve Sailer spent years documenting homicide trends as an independent journalist and analyst who noticed patterns others preferred to ignore. On May 26 2025 he emailed The New York Times with CDC weekly mortality data that directly contradicted their newly published graph marking the fifth anniversary of George Floyd's death. The data showed black homicide victimizations rising sharply after May 25 2020 rather than before it. His earlier articles in Taki's Magazine had already warned that the post-Ferguson pullback in policing was producing lethal results in cities like Baltimore. Those warnings gained new force when the newspaper quietly altered its graph online without any admission in the accompanying text. [1][3][4]
- Steven Rich, Tim Arango, and Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs were the New York Times reporters who published the May 24 2025 article featuring the misleading graph. They presented annual homicide totals plotted as if they all occurred on January 1 which placed the vertical line for Floyd's death after the apparent surge. The piece reached the paper's 11 million subscribers and circulated widely on social media before any correction. Their reporting reflected the conventional wisdom that the homicide spike had predated the racial reckoning and therefore could not be blamed on it. The graph remained uncorrected in the print record even after external criticism. [1][4]
- Daniel Wood designed the graphics for the New York Times article and chose to plot the entire year's homicide total at the start of 2020. This choice created the visual impression that the 29 percent surge had already happened before George Floyd died. The vertical line marking May 25 2020 was placed between the 2020 and 2021 data points. Wood's work embodied the paper's institutional confidence that yearly aggregates told the full story. The subsequent quiet edit to the online version never addressed the original design decision. [1]
- Peter Moskos is a criminologist who pointed out that pandemic stress could not explain the 2020 homicide surge because murders did not rise in hard-hit cities such as Baltimore and Newark. His analysis challenged the dominant narrative that external shocks alone drove the violence. Moskos noted that the timing aligned more closely with protests and depolicing than with coronavirus case counts. His work remained a dissenting voice amid broader media emphasis on economic and health explanations. The data he highlighted later proved consistent with weekly CDC figures. [9]
- Hans Bader analyzed the surge at the Competitive Enterprise Institute and identified reduced incarceration, shrunken police manpower, and sustained anti-police protests as the primary drivers. His report catalogued the Ferguson Effect in multiple cities where enforcement retreated after high-profile incidents. Bader argued that these policy shifts produced measurable increases in black homicide victimization. His conclusions clashed with the prevailing view that the spike was unrelated to Black Lives Matter activism. Subsequent national data supported the pattern he described. [9]
- Thomas Hargrove founded the Murder Accountability Project and argued that protests and depolicing after George Floyd's death caused a 30 percent homicide surge. His organization had long tracked unsolved killings and clearance rates in urban areas. Hargrove emphasized that low clearance rates in black communities encouraged retaliatory violence. His assessment directly contradicted claims that the surge predated Floyd. CDC weekly data later aligned with the timing he identified. [11]
The New York Times promoted the assumption through its May 24 2025 article and graph that placed the vertical line for George Floyd's death after the plotted 2020 homicide totals. The paper reached 11 million subscribers with a visual that implied the surge had already occurred before the racial reckoning. It quietly corrected the online graph after receiving CDC data from outside critics but issued no textual admission or editor's note. The organization continued to frame police killings as the central story while downplaying the larger increase in civilian homicides. Its coverage helped cement the narrative that Black Lives Matter activism could not be responsible for the violence. [1][3][4]
Black Lives Matter organized protests that turned into riots in the weeks after George Floyd's death and sent 127 million emails while coordinating 1.2 million actions. The movement had emerged after Ferguson in 2014 and consistently pushed for reduced police presence in black communities. Its activists were involved in 95 percent of the tracked riots according to insurance industry tallies. The organization framed policing itself as the primary threat to black lives. The subsequent nationwide homicide increase coincided with the depolicing that followed its campaigns. [9]
Baltimore Police Department operated under a federal consent decree sparked by the Freddie Gray case and enforced reforms that included reduced aggressive enforcement. Officials there embraced public health approaches to violence and non-prosecution of low-level offenses. The department's pullback contributed to homicide rates that exceeded even the crack-era peaks of the early 1990s. Its experience became a national case study in the effects of diminished policing. Homicides later declined only after the intensity of anti-police activism faded. [15][21]
Property Claim Services tracked insurance claims from civil disorder since 1950 and ultimately classified the 2020 events as the first multi-state catastrophe exceeding one billion dollars in insured losses. The organization had previously recorded single-city events such as the 1992 Los Angeles riots at 775 million dollars. Its data showed the 2020 unrest spread across twenty states with arson, vandalism, and looting. The scale surpassed all prior records and reflected the nationwide reach of the protests. Officials at the unit described it as an unprecedented event. [22]
Proponents of the assumption pointed to early 2020 homicide rates that were already slightly above 2019 levels and continued widening in March and April before George Floyd's death on May 25. They observed that annual aggregates showed a 29 percent national increase for the full year and argued this surge had begun prior to the protests. Pandemic-related stresses such as job losses, home isolation, and increased firearm carrying seemed like plausible drivers especially in a year of unprecedented lockdowns. A reasonable observer reviewing FBI preliminary data and media reports at the time could conclude that external shocks unrelated to policing explained the violence. The kernel of truth lay in the modest pre-May increases which were real even if they were dwarfed by the summer explosion. [10][23][26]
The New York Times graph plotted the entire 2020 homicide total as if it occurred on January 1 which created the visual impression that the surge predated Floyd. This annual aggregation method had long been standard for yearly trend analysis and therefore appeared credible to readers. The vertical line marking May 25 2020 was placed between the 2020 and 2021 data points reinforcing the idea that the racial reckoning followed rather than contributed to the violence. CDC weekly mortality data later revealed that black homicide victimizations rose sharply only after that date. The graph's design became the most widely circulated piece of evidence for the assumption until its quiet correction. [1][3][4]
Travis Campbell's study claimed that Black Lives Matter protests had reduced police homicides by roughly 200 between 2014 and 2019 while acknowledging more than 3,000 additional civilian homicides. The paper compared protest cities with non-protest cities and seemed methodologically sound to those who viewed police killings as a distinct and more urgent problem. It generated the sub-belief that the lives saved from law enforcement were more valuable than the additional murders because the latter were not directly attributable to the movement. Thomas B. Edsall amplified this framing in his New York Times column which highlighted reduced police killings while downplaying the net increase in deaths. Subsequent analysis showed the civilian homicide toll far outweighed any reduction in police shootings. [11]
Growing evidence suggests the assumption was flawed because CDC weekly data showed the homicide surge accelerating precisely in the weeks after Floyd's death rather than before it. International comparisons revealed homicide declines in other countries facing similar pandemic conditions. City-level studies such as the one in Denver documented a 54 percent spike only after the protests and linked it to eroded trust and depolicing. An influential minority of analysts had warned of this pattern since Ferguson yet their concerns were largely dismissed at the time. The debate is not fully settled but the weight of monthly and weekly figures increasingly challenges the pre-Floyd narrative. [9][10][11]
The assumption spread rapidly through The New York Times which published the misleading graph on May 24 2025 and reached 11 million subscribers before any correction. The visual was shared widely on social media where it reinforced the idea that the homicide spike had nothing to do with the protests that followed Floyd's death. Mainstream outlets including NPR and Brookings emphasized pandemic explanations while omitting any mention of Black Lives Matter or defund-the-police rhetoric. This framing echoed the earlier Ferguson Effect debate but shifted blame away from depolicing. The narrative gained further traction through academic papers and columns that highlighted reductions in police killings without addressing the larger civilian toll. [1][9][10]
Black Lives Matter activism after 2014 and especially after Floyd's death created intense social pressure on police departments to reduce proactive enforcement. Protests in more than 140 cities were often described as mostly peaceful even as insurance losses mounted. Media coverage focused on grievances against law enforcement rather than the subsequent withdrawal of police from high-risk areas. Elite consensus formed quickly around the idea that African Americans needed less rule of law to escape systemic bias. Dissenting voices faced social and professional costs for questioning the new conventional wisdom. [5][13][19]
The Ferguson Effect had already been documented in cities like Baltimore after the 2015 Freddie Gray riots where homicides rose sharply following police pullbacks. This precedent was memory-holed during the 2020 coverage which preferred to treat the surge as a novel pandemic phenomenon. The New York Times opinion section published columns citing studies that emphasized benefits of reduced police killings while minimizing the homicide increases. Public opinion in many progressive circles accepted the narrative that policing itself caused violence. The assumption persisted in official commentary long after weekly CDC data contradicted it. [15][11]
Police departments across the country enacted new training protocols and accountability measures after the 2020 protests based on the belief that poor oversight had caused fatal encounters like George Floyd's. These changes included restrictions on prone restraints and increased scrutiny of use-of-force incidents. Many cities reduced proactive policing in black neighborhoods to avoid further controversy. The policies were justified as necessary reforms that would ultimately save black lives by lowering tensions with law enforcement. Homicide rates rose immediately in cities that adopted the most aggressive versions of these changes. [5][11]
In Baltimore Mayor Brandon Scott and State's Attorney Marilyn Mosby implemented a federal consent decree, repealed aspects of the law enforcement bill of rights, and launched a Comprehensive Violence Reduction Framework that treated gun violence as a public health issue. They stopped prosecuting low-level offenses such as drug possession and prostitution and planned to divert 911 calls to mental health professionals instead of police. These steps were presented as evidence-based alternatives to traditional policing. The city experienced homicide levels worse than the crack era before rates later declined. Similar consent decrees and non-prosecution policies spread to other jurisdictions. [21]
The British Ministry of Justice released statistics showing young black people were nine times more likely to be jailed than young white people which was interpreted as proof of systemic bias. Prime Minister Theresa May and MP David Lammy commissioned reviews that called for action to address ethnic disparities from arrest through sentencing. The Sentencing Council proposed guidelines that would punish white offenders more harshly to reduce per capita disparities. These policies rested on the assumption that unequal outcomes reflected unequal treatment rather than unequal offending rates. The approach drew criticism for undermining deterrence in communities with higher violence. [12]
The assumption concealed the scale of the post-Floyd homicide surge that added roughly 5,000 extra murders in 2020 alone with a majority of victims being African American. Black homicide victimization rose 34 percent that year producing eight additional deaths per 100,000 people in a population already facing elevated baseline rates. CDC data showed the increase persisted into 2021 and 2022 before declining only after anti-police activism waned. Black motor vehicle fatalities also jumped 36 percent in the second half of 2020 compared with a 9 percent rise for other groups. These deaths continued at elevated levels through 2024. [9][10][19]
Insurance losses from the 2020 unrest reached between one and two billion dollars across twenty states making it the most expensive civil disorder event in American history. Arson, vandalism, and looting damaged businesses and strained insurers in ways that exceeded the 1992 Los Angeles riots. The unrest affected cities from coast to coast rather than remaining confined to single metropolitan areas. Many affected neighborhoods experienced long-term economic decline after the destruction. The human cost extended beyond the insured losses to include thousands of additional violent crimes. [22]
The decade following Ferguson produced an estimated 11,000 excess murders according to some analyses with black victims comprising the large majority. Homicide clearance rates in African American communities remained dramatically lower than the national average which encouraged cycles of retaliatory violence. Young black male suicide rates and traffic fatalities also rose during periods of reduced policing. These secondary effects compounded the direct toll of the homicide spike. The assumption that the violence was unrelated to depolicing delayed recognition of these patterns. [8][16][18]
Growing evidence suggests the assumption was flawed after Steve Sailer emailed The New York Times on May 26 2025 with CDC weekly mortality graphs showing black homicide victimizations rising sharply after May 25 2020. The newspaper adjusted its online graph without issuing any textual correction or editor's note. Weekly data from 2018 through 2023 confirmed the surge began in the week of Floyd's death rather than before it. This timing undermined claims that the increase was a pre-existing trend driven solely by the pandemic. An influential minority of analysts had warned of this connection for years and their position gained credibility as the data accumulated. [1][3][4]
Homicide rates dropped sharply in 2023 and continued declining through mid-2025 as anti-police activism lost intensity and normal policing resumed in many cities. CDC WONDER data documented weekly declines that brought rates back toward historical baselines in places like Baltimore. International comparisons showed homicide falls in other countries facing similar economic stresses which weakened the pandemic explanation. City-level studies linked the 2020 spike to depolicing and eroded trust rather than to prior trends. The assumption that the surge predated Floyd became increasingly difficult to maintain in the face of monthly and weekly figures. [8][14][15]
Multivariate analyses controlling for demographics and economic factors found that the 2020 indicator itself predicted higher homicide growth particularly in jurisdictions with stronger anti-police political cultures. Counties with higher Republican vote shares experienced smaller increases suggesting that local attitudes toward policing mattered. The Denver study documented a 54 percent homicide spike only after the protests began. These findings reinforced earlier warnings about the Ferguson Effect. By 2025 the narrative that Black Lives Matter bore no responsibility for the violence had been challenged by a substantial and growing body of evidence even if not all experts accepted the full causal link. [9][10][20]
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BLM Not Responsible for Homicide Spikereputable_journalism
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