False Assumption Registry


South Peasants Hated Communists


False Assumption: South Vietnamese peasants hated Communists as much as pro-Western elites did and broadly supported the US-backed government.

Written by FARAgent on February 11, 2026

In the early 1960s, American officials in Vietnam grew optimistic about popular support for the anti-communist South. Many spoke French due to World War II ties. They consulted pro-Western Vietnamese elites, often Catholic and French-speaking, who insisted everybody hated the Communists.

These elites overlooked rural realities. Buddhist peasants despised French-speaking Catholics as colonial collaborators with foreign devils. This misjudgment fueled overconfidence in South Vietnam's viability, prolonging US involvement amid shaky domestic backing.

The 1975 fall exposed the gap. Despite 1972 successes with smart bombs and low US losses under Vietnamization, Congress banned air support post-Watergate. Laos and Cambodia fell too, validating domino risks, though the chain stopped short of Thailand and Indonesia.

Status: Mainstream now strongly agrees this assumption was false
  • Henry Kissinger, as US National Security Advisor, visited Hanoi and saw museums filled with war displays. He noted the North Vietnamese commitment to conflict. He thought the US had picked the wrong side. [1] He adjusted strategies but faced domestic cuts that limited options. [1] He championed the assumption while trying to adapt. [1]
Supporting Quotes (1)
“When Henry Kissinger first visited Hanoi, to get over jet lag before sitting down to negotiate, he scheduled an initial day touring North Vietnamese museums to learn about their culture. They were all devoted to war. Uh-oh, Dr. K. thought, we picked the wrong side to back.”— 50th Anniversary of the Fall of Saigon
US military and diplomatic officials relied on collaborator elites for insights into popular feelings. They promoted the assumption this way. [1] The US Congress, amid Watergate, banned air support in 1973. They assumed the South could manage alone, despite 1972 evidence to the contrary. [1] This enforced withdrawal based on flawed views. [1]
Supporting Quotes (2)
“a sizable number of Americans in Vietnam spoke French (the US military had been heavily involved in France since June 6, 1944), as did a lot of pro-Western Vietnamese, who assured us...”— 50th Anniversary of the Fall of Saigon
“Democrats in Congress, however, didn’t much notice and, once Watergate got going in 1973, banned American air support.”— 50th Anniversary of the Fall of Saigon
Pro-Western Vietnamese elites spoke French and shared anti-communist views with US officials. They assured Americans that South Vietnamese peasants hated Communists just as much. This seemed credible at the time. [1] It created a belief in solid rural support. But it overlooked peasant resentment toward Catholic collaborators. [1] After World War II, East Asia featured collaborators or communists as effective managers. This fed the idea that US-backed collaborators would work. [1] Cultural resentments went ignored. The assumption was wrong. [1]
Supporting Quotes (2)
“a sizable number of Americans in Vietnam spoke French (the US military had been heavily involved in France since June 6, 1944), as did a lot of pro-Western Vietnamese, who assured us that everybody in South Vietnam hated the Communists as much as they did. But a lot of Buddhist peasants despised French-speaking Catholics as colonial collaborators with the foreign devils.”— 50th Anniversary of the Fall of Saigon
“in most of East Asia there were two main types of locals who knew how to get things done in the modern world: those who had collaborated with the colonizers, whether the Japanese in Korea or the French in Vietnam, and the Communists. We were against the Commies, so that left the collaborators to be our pals.”— 50th Anniversary of the Fall of Saigon
The idea spread through direct talks in Vietnam. French-speaking pro-Western Vietnamese gave personal assurances to French-speaking Americans. [1] This built an elite consensus on peasant backing. [1] It took hold in diplomatic circles without broader checks. [1]
Supporting Quotes (1)
“American officials in the early 1960s were over-optimistic about our popularity with the South Vietnamese peasantry because a sizable number of Americans in Vietnam spoke French... as did a lot of pro-Western Vietnamese, who assured us that everybody in South Vietnam hated the Communists as much as they did.”— 50th Anniversary of the Fall of Saigon
Under Nixon, the Vietnamization policy shifted responsibilities to South Vietnam. It held off a 1972 invasion with success. [1] But Congress later cut air support, assuming self-sufficiency. [1] This rested on the wrong belief in broad peasant support. [1]
Supporting Quotes (1)
“Nixon’s policy of Vietnamization worked strikingly well: In 1972, when the North Vietnamese armored units invaded South Vietnam, the U.S. lost only 739 combat fatalities.”— 50th Anniversary of the Fall of Saigon
The Fall of Saigon came on April 30, 1975. It triggered communist takeovers in Laos and Cambodia. Lives were lost, and regional stability crumbled. [1] The US lost conviction in its efforts. [1] Misjudging local views prolonged the war. This led to Saigon's collapse and domino effects elsewhere. [1]
Supporting Quotes (2)
“When Vietnam fell in 1975, so did Laos and Cambodia.”— 50th Anniversary of the Fall of Saigon
““After America was shamefully run out of Vietnam, people lost their conviction about almost everything.””— 50th Anniversary of the Fall of Saigon
In 1972, North Vietnam invaded. Smart bombs and low US losses repelled it, showing the need for air power. [1] Congress banned that support, enabling the 1975 collapse. [1] This exposed the weakness in peasant support. The assumption proved false. [1]
Supporting Quotes (1)
“American air power appeared to undergo a quantum leap in 1972 with the introduction of the smart bomb... Suddenly in 1972 the age of US air supremacy began... Democrats in Congress... banned American air support.”— 50th Anniversary of the Fall of Saigon

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